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WHY HEALTH LAWYERS MUST 
BE PUBLIC-LAW LAWYERS: 
HEALTH LAW IN THE AGE OF 
THE MODERN REGULATORY 
STATE  
 
ABBE R. GLUCK* 
 
It is my deep privilege to deliver these remarks here at the University 
of Maryland, not only because the Law School has such a premier health-
law faculty but, also, because it was in Maryland where I held my first three 
jobs. One of those former employers, the great Senator from Maryland, 
Paul S. Sarbanes, introduced me to Congress and inspired me to devote my 
career to the subjects of legislation, the political process and the law. And 
that is very much the topic of my remarks tonight, with health law as the 
context. 
Health law is not often framed as part of the “public-law” landscape, 
and my goal is to explain why it should be. My aim is to convince the next 
generation of health lawyers, policymakers, and health-law scholars that 
they must see health law as a field that is intimately related to Congress, 
federal statutes, federal agencies, and federalism, in order to have an impact 
on it. I will then apply this public-law framework to some current events 
involving the 2010 health reform statute—the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”)1—to illustrate how shaping health law today requires an 
understanding of the central roles now played in the field by the 
quintessential players in the public-law domain: Congress, federal agencies, 
the states, and the federal courts. 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Abbe Gluck.  
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Diane Hoffmann for inviting me, to 
Senator Sarbanes for his continuing support and inspiration, and to Journal of Health Care Law 
and Policy editor-in-chief Lindsey Imus. These are edited remarks from the Stuart Rome Lecture, 
delivered at the University of Maryland School of Law on November 20, 2014. 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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I. FROM PRIVATE LAW TO PUBLIC LAW 
 
Why the need for this new framework? Health law has historically 
come from the states, local governments, and the medical profession itself. 
It was state courts and state law that decided most health-law matters, and it 
was the medical profession (through self-regulation) that largely controlled 
the physicians. So understood, health law was what law professors call a 
field of “private law”—a field of law made from the ground up, and which 
focused on regulating relationships among private parties. In the academy, 
health law is often still analyzed and taught this way—around the language 
of private actors or markets, or in terms of the special relationships that 
permeate the field. 
It is very hard to look around today and think that this private, local, 
non-federal narrative still accurately describes the health care landscape. Of 
course, it is the case that states and the profession still have certain, 
localized areas of dominance (medical malpractice and licensing of 
practitioners being two important examples) but, as a general matter, health 
law has become a field of public law—by which I mean a field that is 
defined by the role of the government. The ACA is, of course, the 
culmination of this shift, but it is a transformation that has been underway 
at least since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, which celebrate 
their joint 50th anniversary this year. 
Why does this matter?  It matters because understanding the kind of 
law that health law has evolved into tells us something about the field’s 
modern mission—because the goals and interests of public law are different 
than private law. It also tells us who the key players now are and how and 
why policy change happens. Perhaps most importantly for lawyers, the 
source of health law is now different. Today, health law is made not 
through state or local law, but through the quintessential public law tool: 
big, complex, federal statutes passed by Congress and then implemented by 
federal agencies and courts, sometimes along with other actors, such as the 
states. Health law today is national and statutory. 
This understanding should change at least some of the focus of health 
lawyers, scholars, and policy experts. For example, one rarely sees health-
law literature about Congress, or about how Congress’s own pathologies 
that are completely unrelated to health law (such as its budget rules and 
gridlock problems) have a huge impact on the health policy that it 
generates.2 Nor has there been deep study of health administrative law,3 and 
 
 2. Timothy Westmoreland is a rare exception and has called attention to this issue. See Abbe 
R. Gluck, Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1 (discussing recent Westmoreland lecture on these topics). 
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so we cannot readily answer important questions like the following: In 
which areas of health-law are federal agencies particular movers and 
shakers? In what areas do federal agencies have overlapping jurisdiction? In 
which areas do they have no jurisdiction at all? We also do not have a 
modern account of the very significant state-federal relationships that have 
been created under this new nationalized and statute-ized health-law 
umbrella.  
Moreover, once we understand health law as federal public law, we 
also must think more about whether it makes a difference (and if so, what 
kind of difference) to now have the federal courts in the game. Congress’s 
creation of a federal statutory landscape of health care creates a whole new 
role for the federal judiciary.4 Here, it is important to understand that the 
federal judiciary (similar to Congress) carries with it a lot of its own 
baggage that is completely separate from health law, but that will still have 
a huge effect on it. The current challenge to the ACA in the Supreme Court, 
as I will detail, is precisely such a case. It is case that is about the ACA, of 
course, but it is also about an ongoing feud within the federal courts about 
how federal statutory language should be interpreted, regardless of what the 
subject matter is. 
This jurisprudential transformation of health law is obviously a big 
project, and one that I cannot fully address in a short lecture. Instead, my 
goal is to provide a framework to introduce these questions, and to begin to 
make the case about where health lawyers and law students should be 
directing their focus. 
 
II.  CONGRESS 
 
Let’s start with Congress. Every transformative statute has its own 
special story, and that includes the particulars of the path that the statute 
took through Congress. The ACA’s story is very unique, and courts need to 
understand it before they can enforce it.5 
The ACA is going to go down in history as a textbook example of 
what I am going to call “unorthodox lawmaking”—a term coined by 
 
 3. For two important exceptions to this lack of research, see Eleanor D. Kinney, 
Administrative Law Protections in Coverage Expansions for Consumers under Health Reform, 7 
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 34, 55, 60 (2011), and Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and 
Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4, 5, 33 (2004).  
 4. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Statutory Law of Health Law: The Law of “Statutes in a 
Field” in the Statutory Era (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
 5. For more discussion of how relevant the unique legislative-process story of any one 
statute is to judicial interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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political scientist Barbara Sinclair to connote the end of the “Schoolhouse 
Rock” legislative process.6 I have written a lot about why unorthodox 
lawmaking is important for legal doctrine.7 One important reason is that the 
Supreme Court’s own doctrines of statutory interpretation are based on that 
now defunct Schoolhouse Rock model: the assumption that statutes go 
through a linear process, are internally coherent, and are meticulously and 
consistently drafted.8 
The ACA is the first major statute that is the combined product of five 
congressional committees’ work: three in the House and two in the Senate.9 
One result of this is that multiple drafts were produced and eventually 
merged.10 Another result is that the overlapping jurisdictions of the 
committees led to a great number of intersecting delegations to various 
federal agencies under the oversight of different congressional committees. 
This legislative story also gives us a framework through which to 
understand the state-federal relationships that the ACA creates. Throughout 
the drafting process, the two chambers were divided over the ACA’s 
federalism structure; in particular, they disagreed about whether the Act’s 
new health insurance marketplaces (called “exchanges”) should be run by 
the federal government or by the states.11 As is common, the Senate 
preferred a more state-oriented approach, offering the states the right of first 
refusal to run their own exchanges, and the House took a more nationalist 
approach, preferring a single federal exchange rather than state-run 
versions.  
The Senate’s state-deferential bill passed the full Senate by 60–39 in 
2009.12 The House, however, was vigorously opposed to this bill;13 the plan 
 
 6. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CONGRESS 8–9, 31 (3d ed. 2007).  
 7. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 979 (2013) (highlighting the prevalence of laws developing outside of the 
traditional committee process); Gluck et al., supra note 5.  
 8. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 7. 
 9. See John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative 
Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 138 (2013) (stating that the ACA, 
prior to passage, was referred to the Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Ways and 
Means, Oversight, and Government Reforms Committees).  
 10. See id. at 140 (stating that the three versions of House Bill 3200 were merged into House 
Bill 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act).  
 11. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 578 (2011). 
 12. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted); see generally U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th 
Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 24, 2009, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=111&ses
sion=1&vote=00396 (listing the Senate votes on H.R. 3590). 
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was going to be for the House and the Senate to duke this out, and the 
Senate would then presumably change its bill to reflect whatever 
compromise emerged. But then something happened: Massachusetts 
Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy died, and Republican Scott Brown 
replaced him. This was the game changer, because the Senate now had only 
59 ACA-friendly votes—not 60. If you learned in school that the Senate is a 
majoritarian body, and that 51 is the magic number, you learned wrong. The 
critical number in the Senate is 60, because 60 votes is what is required to 
stop a filibuster, close debate, and move to a vote. 
As a result, the Senate bill could not change because any amendment 
to a bill, like any law itself, requires 60 votes to go anywhere in the U.S. 
Senate. The consequence of all of this is that the initial draft bill that was 
passed, which was intended to be just a starting offer, had to be the final 
bill.14 It was never subject to the two-chamber negotiation, and it was never 
cleaned up for ambiguities or redundancies in drafting (as most statutes are 
and as all had originally assumed the ACA would be) because it never went 
through the Conference Committee stage.15 Conference is the “clean up” 
stage, but occurs only where the House and the Senate are reconciling 
differences across two different bills. Here, the House bill never saw the 
light of day because of the ripple effect of Senator Kennedy’s death on the 
Democrats’ voting block. In the end, it should be clear that Nancy Pelosi is 
really an unsung hero of health reform. As Speaker, she twisted the arms 
she needed to twist and got the House to accept, essentially wholesale, a 
state-exchange oriented bill that the House had vowed never to accept. 
One final important, procedural side note: there was a so-called 
“reconciliation bill”—a special budget measure that was deployed because 
the budget process has special rules that do not allow filibusters; as a result, 
the key number for reconciliation is 50, not 60, votes. The reconciliation 
bill was passed alongside the ACA to give the House a few items that it 
wanted. But reconciliation is no substitute for Conference. Bills generally 
do not get cleaned up in reconciliation, and reconciliation is limited only to 
budget-related changes, so most of the ACA could not be altered through 
that process. The changes that were adopted as part of that measure (called 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act) were consolidated into 
 
 13. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US (Oct. 8, 2009), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-
2009/h768.  
 14. Gluck, supra note 11. 
 15. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 7. 
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the version of the ACA that appears in the statute books, so you have to 
read the notes to know which sections were added through that process.16 
So why do I tell you all of this history? The history is important 
because the ACA is a statute and because it has already survived the 
constitutional challenge to its existence—the 2012 case, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius17—which means that the 
rest of the ACA cases are going to be statutory interpretation cases. Hobby 
Lobby from last term, which was about the ACA’s contraception-mandate 
case, is one example.18 King v. Burwell, pending when this lecture went to 
press, is another.19 The ACA’s procedural history is critical to these kinds 
of cases because courts interpreting statutes make a lot of assumptions 
about how statutes are drafted—assumptions that tend to track the 
“textbook” model of the textbook legislative process. In the context of the 
ACA, however, some of those traditional assumptions are not only totally 
irrelevant, but arguably are malpractice. 
Let me give you a simple example. In Sebelius, some of the early 
briefing had made a very big deal about the fact that the House version of 
the bill contained a so-called “severability clause”—a provision stating that 
if any part of the statute is ruled unconstitutional (as the Medicaid 
expansion ultimately was), Congress still intends the rest of the statute to 
stand.20 Severability clauses are common but, based on the principle of 
legislative deference, the Court also has long applied its own default 
presumption that statutes are presumed severable even without such a 
clause unless they say otherwise.21 Because of that strong presumption, 
Congress often does not include explicit severability clauses, and the Senate 
version of the ACA did not contain one. 
Back to Sebelius. There, the challengers argued that because the House 
version of the bill had a severability clause, the fact that the final bill did 
not have one meant something—i.e., the “dropping” of the clause was 
intentional and so if the Medicaid portion went down in Supreme Court, the 
entire statute should be struck down too.22  
 
 16. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).  
 17. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 18. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
 19. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).  
 20. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION AND INTERPRETATION (2014). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1301 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (“The lack of a severability clause in this case is significant because one 
had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but it was removed in the bill that subsequently 
became law.”), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 
sub nom. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
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I hope even after this mini tutorial you can see what an irresponsible 
argument this was in light of the ACA’s legislative context. The House bill 
means nothing here. Why? Because there was never a two-chamber 
integration of bills. The only bill that matters is the Senate bill because, 
unlike in the case of most legislation, the Senate never even had to 
negotiate with the House version because of Senator Kennedy and the 
freezing in time of the Senate text as the text when he died. 
This is just one example of the new kind of analysis that health 
lawyers and policymakers will need to do if they are going to be effective 
players in this new era of federal statutory health law. King v. Burwell 
raises similarly important issues about understanding how the two drafts 
produced in the Senate merged into one, and what is relevant from that 
process.23 
Another reason it is important to understand health law as a federal 
statutory field is because this reconceptualization of the field has 
implications for policy reform. Today, health policy development must be 
grounded in the context of Congress’s own internal structures and 
understood in the context of Congress’s general lawmaking pathologies.24 
Statutory law experts are quite familiar with the institutionalized inertia of 
the legislative process and its tendencies toward incrementalism and path 
dependence, something that political scientists also have noted for years.25 
As a result, it is very unusual to expect big sweeping changes in a field that 
is dominated by an already-existing landscape of federal statutes. The ACA 
exemplifies this. Congress did not wipe the slate clean. Instead, Congress 
took the preexisting landscape of health law and built upon it. The reason 
this is significant is that the pre-existing landscape itself consisted of many 
different programs, built upon one another and also structured in many 
different ways. The ACA similarly builds upon Medicare—the national 
insurance program for the elderly, run by the federal government; 
Medicaid—the state-federal insurance program for low-income individuals 
that is run jointly by the states and the federal government; and also the 
private-employer insurance system. The ACA does improve on these 
preexisting structures but it keeps them all.26 The result is not the kind of 
 
Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012). 
 23. See 759 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
 24. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the 
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2013) (noting that in 
designing health reform, Congress was typically path-dependent).  
 25. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 
84 (1959) (noting how Western democracies do not change through large “leaps and bounds”).  
 26. Id. 
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statute that any reformer would have drafted from scratch; and it further 
entrenches health law’s structural fragmentation. But it is also not a 
surprise. Even as health policy wonks complained that the ACA had failed 
insofar as it did not ameliorate health law’s fragmentation, experts on 
Congress found the statute’s ultimate structure entirely predictable, even if 
not ideal.  
 
III. AGENCIES 
 
I have provided just a small taste of the ACA’s legislative context. It is 
equally important, however, to understand the administrative context of any 
public-law regime that, like the ACA, leaves so much to implementation. 
The amount of space I shall devote to the agency context here is directly 
inverse to its importance. It is simply too complicated to capture in a brief 
discussion.  
What I do want to point out, however, is that the complexity of the 
subject matter, the need for compromise, and the desire to allow variation in 
ACA implementation across the states led to an enormous amount of 
delegation in the ACA.27 The statute has several hundred delegating 
provisions—an amount that some have surmised is unprecedented.28 
Further, these delegations themselves are highly complex and often involve 
multiple agencies, which are given overlapping jurisdiction. Take, for 
example, the new Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”)—the 
integrated health care concept that is one of the ACA’s flagship 
innovations.29 At least four different agencies (the Treasury, Health and 
Human Services, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of 
Justice) have some authority over ACO formation.30 The result has been 
that the different administrators have had an extremely difficult time with 
coordination efforts because of different goals and different turf interests, 
and because of the fact that the administrators are overseen by different 
 
 27. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT 
TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148) 2, 8 (2010) 
(documenting the array of agencies involved in the Affordable Care Act rulemaking process and 
mechanisms for collaboration).  
 28. Id. 
 29. See Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have our Cake and Eat 
it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2012) (highlighting the significance of accountable 
care organizations in the framework of the Affordable Care Act).  
 30. See Susan S. DeSanti, ACO Antitrust Guidelines: Coordination Among Federal Agencies, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec11_full_source.authc
heckdam.pdf (describing inter-agency coordination of ACO guidelines).  
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congressional committees. As a result, the implementation process has not 
always produced the ideal level of clear guidance to the public.31 
It is also worth noting that the ACA’s administrative process, much 
like its legislative process, has had unorthodox features.32 The agencies 
have had to do an enormous amount of work under intense time constraints, 
public scrutiny and political division.33 The consequence has been that 
agencies have used many unconventional regulating measures, such as 
proceeding through guidance rather than through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,34 that differ importantly from the “textbook” administrative 
law process one learns about in law school.35 This is not a development 
unique to the ACA—it is a much broader trend, as I have illustrated 
elsewhere36—but it is still a central feature of the ACA’s story. 
There are other unique aspects of ACA implementation that have 
received less attention. One of the most important, in my view, is the way 
that Congress changed and improved the process for obtaining Medicaid 
demonstration waivers under the Act.37 The waiver process has become a 
subject of particular interest in recent years among lawyers and legal 
scholars who are focused on state-federal relationships in the context of 
major federal statutes.38 In general, this process of state-federal negotiation 
and receive waivers from federal administrators has been described as a 
“black box,” bereft of a formal framework that ensures notice and fairness 
to both states and the public. The ACA contains an important innovation in 
this area. As Sidney Watson has written, the ACA brings Medicaid 
demonstration waivers “into the light,” with new requirements, including 
 
 31. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations 
and Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 35 (2014) (citing conflicts between health-care 
regulators and antitrust agencies that encumber ACO administration).  
 32. See Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care 
Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 441, 442 (2014) (describing these 
unconventional methods). 
 33. Id..  
 34. Id.  
 35. Gluck et al., supra note 5. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration 
Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 2 (June 2011), 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf (citing changes to obtaining 
demonstration waivers in the Affordable Care Act).  
 38. For a few of many recent examples, see Samuel Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After 
the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); 
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013); 
Theodore Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable 
Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
359 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). 
Gluck Final.docx  
332 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:323 
 
public notice and comment at both the state and federal levels.39 This is an 
important example of how health law is at the cutting edge of many public 
law issues, even if many people do not yet realize it. 
Finally, there is a whole separate story to tell, which I detail in other 
work, about the extreme variety within health law itself when it comes to 
the role of federal agencies.40 Some areas of health law are agency driven; 
others are much less so and, interestingly, this variety exists even across the 
different areas of health law that are all now included in within the same 
overarching statute of the ACA. For example, if one looks at federal court 
cases, one sees relatively few cases involving the Department of Labor’s 
oversight of ERISA, but yet one will find many cases involving Health and 
Human Service’s (“HHS”) (specifically, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”)) oversight of Medicare.41 Part of constructing 
the health law as a public law story is going to require understanding those 
differences. 
 
IV. THE STATES 
 
Federal agencies are not the only major implementers of health 
statutory law; states also play a central role.42 So, increasingly, do private 
actors, but I will not dwell on private actors here. Instead, I will briefly 
discuss what I and my coauthors in other work call the “New Health Care 
Federalism.”43 
One of the most prominent books on health care federalism was 
written right after President Clinton’s health reform effort failed in 1993.44 
The book predicted that health law would “move . . . toward a reduced 
federal role and an increased state role in setting policy, as well as in 
administering and financing it.” 45 That is not what happened, but the 
opposite has not happened either. After 1993, we had HIPPA, the HITECH 
 
 39. Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid 
Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 213 (2015).  
 40. Gluck, supra note 4. 
 41. Id.  
 42. See generally Gluck, supra note 11.  
 43. See Baker et al., The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of How Federalism Has Changed in Health Care and Beyond 3 (U. of Pa. Law 
School, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-34; Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 
525, 2015), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
 44. HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES (Robert F. Rich & William 
D. White eds., 1996). 
 45. Id. at 294 (emphases added). 
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Act, the new Medicare (parts C and D), and now the ACA. This steady 
stream of statutes effectuated a massive federalization of the field and could 
have displaced the states. But it didn’t. Instead—and quite interestingly—
Congress chose in these same statutes to retain and enlarge the state role in 
significant ways.46  
There is a whole industry of law professors currently fighting over 
whether the kind of state-federal relationships that statutes like the ACA set 
up actually advance “federalism”—our bedrock constitutional principle of a 
duel government, in which both the states and the federal governments have 
meaningful roles to play.47 I take on that question elsewhere,48 but for 
present purposes, I will note that I do think the ACA advances federalism. I 
reach this conclusion because, today, one has to understand federalism in 
light of the massive expansion of federal legislative power that has occurred 
since the New Deal.49 Congress can now regulate almost anywhere it 
wishes, provided it designs its statutes correctly. States have little to gain 
anymore from insisting on total separation from federal law because if they 
do so insist, they will likely lose their chance to shape major questions of 
policy that have a direct effect on their citizens.50  
When it comes to the ACA, for example, the big mistake is to think 
that the alternative to Congress’s intervention was state intervention—it 
wasn’t. The alternative was just more federal government. The big 
federalism choice in the ACA was what divided the House and Senate—
whether the federal government should regulate with the states, or acting 
alone. The states would have been rendered irrelevant to large swaths of 
health law had they been left out of the ACA altogether and now, because 
they were not left out, are instead central players in ACA policy. I call this 
“federalism from federal statutes,” to signify how state power today inures 
from within federal statutory schemes. And this is one fundamental way in 
which the concept of federalism in health care has changed dramatically in 
the modern era.51 To be sure, the idea that federalism is generated by 
 
 46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1178 (2006) (allowing exceptions to the requirements under HIPAA 
as long as the state meets certain additional requirements under the section); 42 U.S.C. § 1321 
(2010) (granting states “flexibility in operation and enforcement of Exchanges”). 
 47. Feature, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014).  
 48. Abbe Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; Heather K. Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941, 
942–43 (2013) (“If the federal government wants to invade a regulatory sphere, it will find a way 
to do it.”); Abbe Gluck, Federalism From Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the 
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1755–56 (2013) (arguing that if 
states resist Congress’s attempts to include them in federal policies, Congress will simply 
“legislate without states partners,” which will increase federal power).  
 51. Gluck, supra note 48. 
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Congress is counterintuitive at first and it is very different from traditional 
constitutional theories of federalism. This federalism is an option—not an 
entitlement—and it varies across statutory schemes.52 But that does not 
mean that there is not power in it for the states.53 
Let me illustrate this point with a few examples from the current 
landscape of ACA implementation. Most people are familiar with the 
basics. There are two large pieces of the ACA that rely on state 
implementation: (1) the Medicaid expansion, and (2) the insurance 
exchanges. 
In the context of Medicaid, we have seen the states exert a lot of 
leverage and experimentation from the inside of this federal scheme—not 
by staying outside of it. We have seen the states negotiating with HHS to 
run Medicaid in unusual ways for instance, by essentially privatizing it, as 
Arkansas’s experience exemplifies.54 Those states never could have 
reconfigured Medicaid in this way had they just washed their hands of the 
whole thing. 
The insurance exchange federalism story has even more layers. Even 
as Senators and state advocates lobbied successfully in Congress to ensure 
that states would be given the right of first refusal to run the exchanges, 
politics have overcome initial policy preferences. In what has been mostly 
an act of political resistance to the ACA as a whole, thirty-four states have 
now refused to run their own exchanges. 55 The ACA requires the federal 
government to run the exchanges for states that decline to do so.56 The big 
irony is evident. The states most opposed to the federalization of health care 
in the first place are the very same states that now have invited the federal 
government to take over their insurance markets. 
Perhaps even more interesting from a federalism perspective is how 
the exchange story has confounded the traditional federalism 
categorizations. The ACA has either changed our understanding of 
federalism or is the most visible evidence yet of changes that were already 
underway. As most lawyers are well aware, federalism has several defining 
 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.; see also Gerken, supra note 50, at 943 (stating that the interplay between the federal 
government and states under the Affordable Care Act offers states “meaningful opportunities for 
states to exercise power”).  
 54. Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-in-arkansas/. 
 55. See Sarah Kliff, It's Official: The Feds Will Run Most Obamacare Exchanges, WASH. 
POST (February 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/18/its-
official-the-feds-will-run-most-obamacare-exchanges/, 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2010) (providing that if a state does not establish an 
exchange, the secretary and federal government shall establish an exchange within that state).  
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features. One of the most famous is the idea that we look to the states and 
not the federal government when we desire experimentation or local 
variation. This is the “states as laboratories” argument, most famously 
articulated by Justice Brandeis in 1932.57 The new health care federalism 
inverts this assumption in important ways that have purchase for modern 
federalism in general. 
As it turns out, the whole “states as laboratories” idea was not 
working—not only in health care, but in many other fields as well.58  States 
often do not experiment at the level thought ideal for policy development.  
Experimentation is expensive and risky; states may lose business to 
neighboring states if they get too creative or protective on their own. 
Indeed, it may not be common knowledge that some of the most important 
state-led policy experiments of the modern age have come not through 
states acting alone, but rather through states acting through federally-funded 
regulatory schemes. In the environmental context, for instance, satisfactory 
levels of state innovation in the area of air-pollution control did not occur 
organically until Congress passed the major environmental statutes of the 
1970s that effectively required the states to take the lead or have their air-
quality laws preempted by federal statute. In the Medicaid context, it was 
states that first took advantage of that program’s flexibility to innovate and 
expand the benefits-eligible population beyond the federal statute’s initial 
target of children and their mothers. These state experiments, supported and 
incentivized by the federal government, formed the basis of Medicaid’s 
subsequent national expansions to cover those same populations. So, too, 
the philosophy behind the ACA’s own Medicaid expansion—eligibility 
based on an income threshold rather than demographic categories—was 
first pioneered as a Medicaid state option by a few aggressive states. The 
Massachusetts health reform law—the law on which much of the ACA was 
based—was not an independent state experiment but rather was done 
through Medicaid, specifically through a Medicaid waiver granted by the 
Bush Administration.59 All of these are examples of experimentalism that 
 
 57. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
 58. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 610–11 (1980); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 924–26 (1994); Gluck, 
supra note 4, at 1764. See generally David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic 
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008). 
 59. See generally An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 
2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58, available at 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2006/Chapter58 (explaining the various 
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derives from national statutory law—from Congress getting in the game 
and not stepping aside, which is an inversion of the typical federalism 
account. 
Another inversion is also worth emphasizing. In the traditional 
account, “nationalism” is associated with policy uniformity, and 
“federalism” with policy variation across the states. Statutes like the ACA 
turn those assumptions upside down by not only tolerating, but also 
incentivizing a wide variety of policy implementation across the states 
within a single federal law. Congress expected Utah’s exchange to look 
very different from Massachusetts’s, and it designed the ACA to allow for 
that difference.60 The result is the kind of local policy tailoring that we 
traditionally associate with leaving states to their own devices, but which 
we actually get here by nationalizing health law.  
Another common feature of federalism theory that the ACA calls into 
question goes to the way we tend to talk about state participation in federal 
law. Federalism theorists often measure federalism’s “success” in terms of 
state cooperation. Scholars identify and puzzle over “cooperative 
federalism,” “uncooperative federalism,” and countless variations on that 
concept. But the ACA has made it difficult to measure federalism’s success 
using this metric because statutes like the ACA dramatically complicate 
what it means to cooperate in this context. 
Some states, like New York, are clearly cooperating even though they 
have not let the federal government in. These states have gone and 
implemented the exchanges on their own, and all is well. But consider 
Oregon. Oregon is a “blue” state that tried to be “cooperative” by 
implementing its own exchange, but it failed, and the federal government 
has had to step in.61 Now that the federal government is in Oregon, as a 
formal legal matter, Oregon’s exchange looks no different than Texas’s. 
 
features and mechanisms put in place through the Massachusetts Health Law); Ryan Lizza, 
Romney’s Dilemma, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/06/06/romneys-dilemma (discussing how Governor 
Romney appealed for a waiver from the Bush Administration to expand state Medicaid benefits). 
 60. Cf. June M. Sullivan, Health Insurance Exchanges: Contrasts Between Utah and 
Massachusetts, ABA.HEALTH ESOURCE (May 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_healt
h_law_esource_0512_sullivan.html (discussing the differences in the health information 
exchanges between Utah and Massachusetts, as these two exchanges were formed before the 
ACA). 
 61. See Maria L. La Ganga, Oregon Dumps Its Broken Healthcare Exchange for Federal 
Website, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-oregon-drops-broken-healthcare-
exchange-20140425-story.html (discussing that despite Oregon’s early enthusiasm, officials had 
to drop its own exchange and use the federal website instead). 
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After all, the federal government is running the Texas exchange, too. 
Texas’s decision not to cooperate, however, was an act of political 
defiance—not the result of a good-faith effort that fell short due to 
technological limitations.62 Are Oregon and Texas really to be viewed in 
the same way from a federalism perspective just because they both have a 
federally operated exchange? What if the federally operated exchange in 
both states looked exactly the same? 
The point is that it now becomes very hard to determine what 
constitutes “a “success” for federalism, or, more existentially, to determine 
what federalism is for. Sometimes when it comes to the ACA, it seems like 
federalism is just a matter of attitude, and that can’t be right.  
A third defining feature of federalism is state sovereignty and 
autonomy, and the loss of that state power is always a looming fear in 
cooperative federalism schemes because states are implementing federal 
law instead of their own. To this fear, I want to offer two responses.  
First, consider which states have had more “autonomy”; those that 
worked with the federal government to design their own exchanges or to 
come up with their own versions of Medicaid, or those that just refused to 
play and/or let the federal government take over? 
Second, ask yourself what would happen to state law if some 
advocates had gotten their wish during the drafting of the ACA—i.e., if 
Congress had left the states out of the ACA altogether. In that case, the 
ACA would be completely federal, like a “Medicare for all” (which some 
had advocated). As for the states? State legislatures, courts, and 
administrators would now be largely irrelevant to health law and policy. 
But, because Congress chose the opposite path, there has instead been an 
enormous number of new state laws, state regulations, newly appointed 
state officials, and state court cases trigged by the ACA because the ACA 
sets in motion a new scheme that requires a lot of state lawmaking as part of 
its implementation.63 In other words, the ACA depends on the states’ legal 
apparatus, and so gives continuing relevance to that apparatus—to the state 
legislatures, courts, administrators, and so on, that a different statutory-
design choice could have rendered irrelevant in the health care context.64 
 
 62. See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & 
Human Serv. (July 9, 2012) (on file with Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom), available at 
http://www.cchfreedom.org/pdf/HHS_Secretary_Sebelius-Rick_Perry.pdf (calling the ACA a 
“power grab” and emphasizing that its “unsound encroachments” into Texas’ sovereignty would 
not occur).  
 63. Baker et al., supra note 43; Gluck, supra note 48. 
 64. See KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES (Jan. 2014), available at 
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The final point I want to make here is about the state-federal 
negotiations that have occurred. The ACA story substantiates a view that is 
emerging in the broader federalism literature, which is that this world of 
administrative negotiation is really where the action is located when it 
comes to federalism in general. One major concern has been that these 
negotiations in general have been largely lawless. Even the statutory waiver 
process, for instance, which is a central site of these interactions, has lacked 
legal rules to guide state-federal interactions and ensure fairness. This will 
be a very significant area for future law development, and as noted, the 
ACA’s Medicaid provisions have a groundbreaking process innovation in 
this regard that people in other fields soon will notice.65  
Secondly, on this point, some have taken the view that the federal 
government is being too “wimpy,” and the President has ceded too much 
ground to the states in these federalism negotiations. But I think real issue is 
that the interests and time horizons of the federal government are just very 
different from those of the states; this is an important difference that 
modern federalism theorists should recognize more than they currently 
do.66 
The whole philosophy of the ACA on the federal side is just to get this 
thing in the door and improve it down the line. It is a very pragmatic 
politics.67 The President’s interest—unlike that of many state officials—is 
long term. He wants to get the statute entrenched. HHS, therefore, is likely 
willing to do whatever it can within the limits of the law to let even resistant 
states adopt the ACA in some way, whether it is by restricting Medicaid, or 
doing something creative with the exchanges. To be clear, HHS is given 
very broad discretion within the statute, and is permitted by the statute to 
make the kinds of concessions that some wish it had not made.  But each 
additional state action to implement the ACA, it is critical to remember, 
enmeshes the statute further in a state’s legal, bureaucratic, and political 
web.  
In other words, it is not that the federal government is desperate; 
rather, it is acting with a long term strategy of federal statutory 
entrenchment—a common story in the statutory-law literature that health 
 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-
report/2014/jan/1727_keith_implementing_aca_state_of_states.pdf.  
 65. Watson, supra note 39. 
 66. Baker et al., supra note 43. 
 67. See Ruger, supra note 38 (discussing how the Obama administration’s goal of entrenching 
the ACA for the long term lends itself to flexibility in negotiations with states on mechanisms for 
implementation). 
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lawyers need to understand.68 This is how to ensure that even if a 
Republican gets elected President, the statute is more likely to be tweaked 
than repealed. 
 
V. COURTS 
 
This brings me to my last topic—the ACA and the courts. This statute 
has been subject to court battle since literally the day it was signed.69 It now 
has survived the 2012 constitutional challenge and the Hobby Lobby 
contraceptive-mandate dispute essentially intact, as well as other less 
significant court challenges.70  
Now we have the new challenge: King v. Burwell, pending at the time 
this lecture went to press.71 King brings together all of the themes of this 
lecture. It is about the legislative context of the ACA, its statutory 
interpretation, its agency implementation, and its federalism story. It is also 
inevitably a story about the unique politics of health reform—and one hopes 
it is not going to be a story about the next Bush v. Gore.72  
In November of 2014, the Supreme Court took the rare action of 
granting review in the case before the lower courts had finished deciding 
it.73 There were four cases going through the federal circuits dealing with 
the same issue, but only one had been finally decided before the Court 
granted review.74 The D.C. Circuit (widely viewed as the second most 
powerful court in the nation) had scheduled a full court review of its 
 
 68. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010) 
(detailing this process of administrative and statutory entrenchment). 
 69. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federal-State Tensions in Fulfilling the ACA’s Promises, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/federal-state-tensions-in-
fulfilling-the-acas-promises/ (stating that the day the law was signed, states challenged the 
mandated Medicaid expansion). 
 70. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
 71. 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
 72. At the time I delivered the Stuart Rome lecture, I had not yet written an amicus brief in 
King and had not planned to do so. However, I did in fact write a brief shortly before these 
remarks went to press. These remarks should be taken as entirely separate from the brief and were 
finalized long before it was written.  
 73. King, 759 F.3d 358; Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc 
granted and judgment vacated per curiam, No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 4, 2014). 
 74. Halbig, 758 F.3d 390; King, 759 F.3d 358; Indiana v. IRS., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (S.D. 
Ind. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
139501 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014), appeal held in abeyance, No. 14-7080, 2014 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24498 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2014), cert denied, No. 14-586, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 773 (Jan. 26, 
2015).  
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respective case for December 17, 2014.75 Rather than wait for that 
decision—as is the Supreme Court’s usual practice—the Court plucked the 
Fourth Circuit’s completed case for early review.76 This aggressive grant of 
certiorari raised concerns about the politicization of the case. 
On the topic of politics, and to really understand what the case is 
about, we need to go back to 2010, when conservative scholar Michael S. 
Greve made the following speech about the ACA: 
 
This bastard has to be killed as a matter of political 
hygiene. I do not care how this is done, whether it’s 
dismembered, whether we drive a stake through its heart, 
whether we tar and feather it and drive it out of town, 
whether we strangle it. I don’t care who does it, whether 
it’s some court some place, or the United States Congress. 
Any which way, any dollar spent on that goal is worth 
spending; any brief filed toward that end is worth 
filing . . . .77 
 
Mr. Greve went on to urge a litigating strategy what would 
“concentrate on bits and pieces of this law.”78 King is the direct result of 
that strategy. The case is brought by the same lawyers who brought the 
2012 constitutional case and even one of the plaintiffs is the same.79 The 
case seizes on four words of this 2,000 page statute to argue that the ACA’s 
insurance-purchase subsidies are not allowed on those exchanges that are 
operated by the federal government.80  
This reading is devastating to the statute. Without the subsidies, the 
exchanges will not function as they are supposed to in the three-dozen 
states that have federally-operated exchanges. The ACA sets out an intricate 
plan: it requires insurers to insure everyone, and to insure them at 
 
 75. No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). 
 76. King, 135 S. Ct. 475.  
 77. Michael S. Greve, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Conference: Who’s in 
Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Dec. 7, 2010), 
available at https://www.aei.org/press/whos-in-charge-more-legal-challenges-to-the-patient-
protection-and-affordable-care-act/.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012); King v. Burwell, 759 
F.3d 358, 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).  
 80. See King, 759 F.3d. at 368 (summarizing plaintiffs’ argument and interpretation of 
statutory language in § 36B of the ACA).  
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essentially equal rates.81 The ACA then supports the insurance market, 
which otherwise could not absorb these requirements, by requiring 
everyone to get insured (the infamous “insurance mandate”), and it makes 
that insurance requirement affordable with the subsidies.82 Without the 
subsidies, insurance will be too expensive and thereby trigger certain 
statutory exemptions from the mandate. As a result, many individuals will 
be exempt from the requirement even as the insurers are still subject to their 
own requirements.83 The consequence of all of this, as has been amply 
demonstrated by others, is that the insurance markets will likely collapse.84 
It should now be clear how King brings the story of this lecture 
together. King is about the clarity with which the statute is drafted. 
Remember that the ACA’s drafting history was highly unorthodox, and did 
not have the last stage cleanup process that statutes usually have.85 King is 
also about the agency’s role in interpreting the statute. Specifically, what is 
being challenged in the case is a Treasury regulation that interprets the 
language in question authorizing the subsidies.86 Finally, King is, of course, 
about federalism. King has legs because of the unexpected federalism twists 
in the ACA implementation, because many states unexpectedly decided not 
to operate the exchanges themselves even after they had insisted on that 
opportunity when the statute was being drafted.87 
But King is also about a huge, established landscape of black-letter 
federal statutory-interpretation law that existed before health reform that 
now must decide health reform’s future. After all, as I have emphasized, the 
 
 81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (guaranteeing availability of coverage); 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-3 (2012) (prohibiting exclusion or discrimination based on preexisting conditions or health 
status). 
 82. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum essential 
coverage for themselves and any dependents); 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (allowing refundable tax 
credit for coverage under a qualified health plan). 
 83. See Brief of America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 9, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015) (explaining that when healthy 
individuals opt out of health insurance coverage, this drives up the risk profile and premium costs 
of insurance pools for all participants). 
 84. See id. at 10–12 (cautioning that “adverse selection” will destabilize insurance markets, 
noting several failed state-level market reforms that were implemented without requiring 
individuals to purchase insurance or pay a penalty, and without subsidizing premiums). 
 85. See supra Part II (reviewing the unique drafting history of the ACA). 
 86. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 
(2014) (“[P]laintiffs contend that the statutory language calculating the amount of premium tax 
credits according to the cost of the insurance policy that the taxpayer ‘enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under [§ 1311]’ precludes the IRS's interpretation that the 
credits are also available on national Exchanges.” (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A), 
(c)(2)(A)(i))). 
 87. See Brief for Professors Thomas W. Merrill et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 8–9, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Merrill Brief]. 
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ACA is federal statutory law and so health reform now lives and dies by the 
legal doctrines that apply to statutes.  
The scope of this lecture does not permit an exhaustive rehearsal of the 
statutory doctrines relevant to King, and I have written too much about 
them elsewhere to give justice here to the full range of argument. But let us 
just consider a few, by way of illustration.88 One question in King is 
whether the Court should focus on the literal meaning of the four contested 
words in isolation or in the broader context of the statute. The Court’s 
statutory doctrines answer this question, with countless cases in which 
Court’s textualists, including Justice Scalia, have insisted that statutory 
language must be read in context and in light of surrounding statutory 
provisions. There are also settled doctrines to govern questions of statutory 
ambiguity when an agency regulation is at issue. Consider the third most 
cited Supreme Court case in history—the Chevron case—which holds that 
when a statute is ambiguous, the Court must defer to implementing the 
agency’s interpretation of that statute.89 Equally important is the long line 
of doctrine that holds that federal statutes will not be interpreted to intrude 
on the states without clear notice and crystal clear statutory language.90 
Instead, the King challengers are making an argument that rewrites 
history. Namely, they argue that Congress, at the time the ACA was 
drafted, needed some kind of incentive to push the states to operate their 
own exchanges, and so Congress wrote a statute that punishes the states if 
they refuse—namely, by denying the subsidies whenever the federal 
government has to operate an exchange. I have already described how the 
ACA’s own legislative evolution and the statute’s federalism design tell 
exactly the opposite story—that state-centered advocates insisted on giving 
states the right of first refusal and so no “stick” was needed.  
 
 88. For more detail, see generally Abbe Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King—Obamacare 
Subsidies as Textualism’s Big Test, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-king-obamacare-subsidies-as-
textualisms-big-test/; Brief for William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015). 
 89. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 90. Merrill Brief, supra note 87; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (“[I]f 
Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.” (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))); Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (“Congress must express clearly its intent 
to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether 
or not to accept those funds.”). 
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Additionally, the challengers’ narrative is deeply undermined by the 
statutory text itself.91 As I have detailed in other venues, we need only look 
as far as the Medicaid provisions of the ACA—which in no uncertain terms 
withdraw federal funds for states that did not expand Medicaid as the ACA 
envisioned—to see that Congress knew how to punish states for 
nonparticipation when it wanted to, and that Congress knew how to make 
those consequences clear.92 The complete absence of anything analogous 
when it comes to the exchanges is the kind of damning textual evidence on 
which the Court routinely relies and it makes the government’s point. This 
point is further buttressed by the Court’s established legal doctrines on 
federalism, which require “unmistakably clear” notice required to the states 
of the consequences of their decision to be part of a federal statutory 
scheme. There are other textual supports. For instance, the statute repeats 
the phrase “state flexibility” more than five times in the context of 
describing the states’ choice to operate an exchange and has a provision that 
expressly sets forth the consequences of the states’ decision not to do so—a 
provision that nowhere contains the penalty that challengers would find 
buried, later in the law, in a section directed at how individuals should 
calculate their tax credits.  
I cannot do justice to this complex case here, so by way of conclusion 
I will just walk through the primary textual debates in the case. The only 
definition of the exchanges in the ACA is in Section 1563, which defines 
“Exchange” as “an American Health Benefit Exchange established under 
section [1311].”93 Section 1311 is the state exchange provision, and 
provides that the “state shall establish an American Health Benefit 
Exchange.”94 Section 1321 spells out the consequences of the state’s failure 
to operate its own exchange.95 Notably, that section is entitled “state 
flexibility”—not state punishment—and sits in a Part of the Act with the 
same title.96 Section 1321 provides that if a state “will not have any 
required Exchange operational”—note the “capital E” in “Exchange”—“. . . 
the Secretary shall . . . establish and operate such [capital E] Exchange 
 
 91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012) (explaining the consequences of a state’s noncompliance 
with the Medicaid Provision of the statute). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (Supp. V 2012).  
 94. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
 95. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012). 
 96. Id. 
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within the state.” (emphasis added). 97 The natural reading of this language 
is that the Secretary is establishing the state Exchange.98 
Now, it is true that when you get to Section 1401, the statute says that 
subsidies are calculated based on months enrolled in an “exchange 
established by the state under 1311,” which is the state exchange 
provision.99 In a vacuum, this looks like only the state exchanges get the 
subsidies; but we know from the other sections of the ACA that the federal 
exchange is, by definition, establishing such a state exchange because the 
Act says that the only kind of exchange that exists is a state “Exchange.” 
That’s confusing indeed, but this confusion clears up quickly when 
you read the rest of the 2,000 page statute. Throughout the statute, there are 
scores of other mentions of the (capital E) Exchange that apply clearly to 
both state and federal exchanges. At least six of those mentions are in the 
tax credit Section 1401 with no qualifying language, and which includes a 
provision that specifically requires both federal and state exchanges to 
report the subsidies that they have doled out to the IRS.100 These provisions 
make no sense if the federal exchanges do not have subsidies.  
The challengers in King have argued that they have the clear text on 
their side, and that all the government has is an amorphous congressional 
purpose. This is good strategic framing, but it is wrong. This is not a text vs. 
purpose case.101 One does not need to go beyond the text of the ACA itself 
to see the structure of the statute, and no one should because the ACA’s 
legislative history, as I have detailed, is too convoluted. 
The text of the statute alone makes clear that the whole thing depends 
on the insurance subsidies. The text  emphasizes “state flexibility”; contains 
many provisions that assume the federal exchanges will be giving out the 
tax credits and allows an easy comparison to the Medicaid provisions, 
which do explicitly threaten the states with rescinding federal funds if the 
states do not cooperate. At a minimum, these textual provisions make the 
statute ambiguous—even though the government goes farther to argue that 
the statutory text unequivocally supports its position. 
In this regard, it is quite important to emphasize which side bears the 
legal burden and which side is benefitted by any finding of ambiguity. All 
 
 97. Id. (emphasis added).  
 98. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 
(2014) (explaining the defendant’s interpretation of the statute, who described “Exchange” as a 
state Exchange set up by the Secretary). 
 99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (Supp. IV 
2011).  
 100. 26 U.S.C. § 36B.  
 101. Gluck, supra note 88.  
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of the relevant doctrines in this area favor the government if the statute is 
not clear. The Chevron doctrine requires deference to the agency if the 
statute is ambiguous. The federalism doctrines require “unmistakable 
clarity” before a statute will be read to impose dramatically on the states, as 
the challengers’ reading would. The Court also presumes that Congress 
does not make huge changes (especially ones that penalize states) without 
being clear, and also that Congress does not write statutes that are designed 
to fail. To effectuate these presumptions, courts apply the so-called “major 
questions rule,” which assumes—in Justice Scalia’s colorful phrasing of 
words—that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”—that it 
doesn’t sneak major things into statutes by burying them in indirect or 
unclear language.102 One should also not forget the doctrines of 
constitutional avoidance and severability, which direct courts—out of 
deference to the legislature—to construe statutes so as not to be 
dysfunctional. 
In King, the challengers are arguing something totally implausible; 
namely, that Congress sowed the seeds of the statute’s own destruction 
intentionally into the act—that Congress set up its own federal exchanges to 
fail—and that it did so intentionally and without explicit language. This is 
an assumption that even the ACA dissenters in the 2012 case, Sebelius, 
flatly rejected. There, the Joint Dissent assumed the availability of the 
subsidies across all exchanges, and argued that the statute makes no sense 
without the subsidies and cannot function without them.103 As the dissent 
put it there: 
 
Congress provided a backup scheme; if a State declines to 
participate in the operation of an exchange, the Federal 
Government will step in and operate an exchange in that 
State. 
. . . 
That system of incentives collapses if the federal subsidies 
are invalidated. Without the federal subsidies, individuals 
would lose the main incentive to purchase insurance inside 
the exchanges, and some insurers may be unwilling to offer 
insurance inside of exchanges. With fewer buyers and even 
fewer sellers, the exchanges would not operate as Congress 
intended and may not operate at all.104 
 
 102. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 103. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2674 (2012) (joint dissent). 
 104. Id. at 2665, 2674 (emphasis added). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
And so, here we are, in the middle of year five of the ACA’s life, and 
with a statute that significantly transforms health law from a private law 
regime to a field of public law. We have a Congress that has tried to repeal 
the statute more than 40 times, we have state resistance, and we have 
another Supreme Court case. 
We also have a Supreme Court that, as I detail elsewhere, does not 
have much health law experience, does not really understand the statutory 
schemes, and certainly does not take a coherent approach to the issues in the 
field.105 This is why it is time to start thinking deeply about what it means 
to understand health law as federal statutory law, and to equip our health-
law students with those doctrines. We need to start lawyering about health 
law in the public-law context in which it now unquestionable resides. I hope 
you will join me in doing so.  
 
 
 105. Gluck, supra note 4. 
